Evidence Collection & Preservation Framework¶

State Court Litigation to Block ICE at Polling Places — All Phases¶

Prepared for: Protections for Elections Classification: Attorney-Client Work Product / Litigation Strategy

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¶

This document establishes a comprehensive evidence collection and preservation protocol supporting the three-phase state court litigation strategy to prevent armed federal agents from being deployed to polling places during the November 2026 elections. The evidentiary record must serve three distinct functions across the litigation timeline: (1) establishing ripeness and the reality of the threat for declaratory judgment actions; (2) demonstrating irreparable harm and likelihood of success for preliminary injunctions; and (3) supporting emergency TRO motions with real-time evidence of imminent or actual deployment.

The evidence falls into seven categories, each requiring distinct collection methods, authentication protocols, and chain-of-custody procedures. The current evidentiary landscape is already extraordinarily rich — the Trump administration and its allies have generated a remarkable public record of statements, demands, and actions that establish both the credibility and imminence of the threat. The challenge is not finding evidence but systematically collecting, authenticating, and organizing it for rapid deployment in state court proceedings across eleven jurisdictions.

II. THE SEVEN CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE¶

Category 1: Government Statements and Official Actions¶

Purpose across all phases: Establishes the reality and credibility of the threatened deployment; demonstrates that the controversy is ripe for adjudication; provides the factual predicate for claims that voter intimidation is occurring or imminent.

What to collect:

A. Direct Statements from Trump Administration Officials

These are the most powerful pieces of evidence for Phase 1 declaratory relief because they establish that the threat is not hypothetical.

President Trump's statements: - February 2, 2026: Trump told Dan Bongino that Republicans should "nationalize the voting" and "take over the voting in at least 15 places." He stated: "The Republicans should say, 'We want to take over.'" He later doubled down in the Oval Office, calling states "agents of the federal government" and arguing federal authorities should "get involved." - Trump identified specific cities — Detroit, Philadelphia, and Atlanta — as targets, claiming "horrible corruption" was taking place in Democratic-led cities. - Trump stated his regret from 2020 was that he "didn't take the voting machines." - Trump promised "a day of retribution" for Minnesota in a social media post during the ICE surge.

Steve Bannon's statements (February 3, 2026): - On his War Room podcast: "You're damn right we're gonna have ICE surround the polls come November. We're not going to sit here and allow you to steal the country again. And you can whine and cry and throw your toys out of the pram all you want, but we will never again allow an election to be stolen." - Bannon remains a figure of significant influence in the administration despite holding no official position.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt (February 6, 2026): - When asked if she could guarantee ICE agents wouldn't be near polling locations: "I can't guarantee an ICE agent won't be around a polling place." - Stated she had "not heard the president consider" deploying agents to polling sites but explicitly refused to rule it out.

Acting ICE Director Todd Lyons (February 12, 2026): - Told Senate Homeland Security Committee: "There's no reason for us to deploy to a polling facility." - When pressed by Sen. Slotkin about "uniformed and masked ICE agents encircling polling places," responded: "Like I said, there's no reason to use ICE officers." - NOTE: This statement is valuable for its implicit acknowledgment that deployment has been discussed, but it is NOT a binding commitment and does not come from the White House or DHS leadership. It should be presented alongside the White House's refusal to guarantee non-deployment.

AG Pam Bondi's letter to Gov. Tim Walz (January 24, 2026): - Demanded Minnesota hand over voter registration records, Medicaid/food assistance records, and repeal sanctuary policies — explicitly linking ICE enforcement operations to voter roll demands. - The letter was sent on the same day Border Patrol agents killed Alex Pretti in Minneapolis. - Minnesota attorneys described this in federal court as a "ransom note" and "shakedown letter." - Secretary of State Steve Simon called it "an outrageous attempt to coerce Minnesota into giving the federal government private data on millions of U.S. Citizens."

B. Official Federal Actions Demonstrating Pattern

Deployment of 3,000+ federal officers (ICE and CBP) to Minneapolis-St. Paul in January 2026.
FBI raid on Fulton County, Georgia election facility to seize 2020 ballots, supervised by DNI Tulsi Gabbard at Trump's request, with Trump personally calling to "thank the agents."
DOJ lawsuits against 24 states for refusing to turn over voter registration data.
Trump administration's offer to decrease ICE presence in Minnesota in exchange for voter file data — characterized by federal judge as potentially coercive.
DOJ monitoring of elections in majority-Latino counties during November 2025 elections.
National Guard deployments to major cities (Chicago, Los Angeles) preceding any election-related deployment.
Trump's executive order on voting and election administration.

Collection protocol:

Video recordings of all statements must be preserved in original format with metadata intact. For broadcast media (War Room podcast, press briefings), download original video files, not clips. Record the URL, timestamp, date, and platform.
Official documents (Bondi letter, executive orders, DOJ demands) should be collected as original PDFs from government websites. Screenshot the web page showing the document at its government URL with date/time visible. If documents are later removed, the Wayback Machine archive and your preserved copies become critical.
Congressional testimony (Lyons's Senate testimony) — obtain the official transcript from the Senate Homeland Security Committee. Video of the hearing should also be preserved. The C-SPAN archive is a reliable source.
White House press briefing transcripts — the official White House transcript is the primary source. Cross-reference with video recordings in case transcripts are later altered or removed.
Social media posts — for Trump's social media posts (Truth Social, X), use full-page screenshots showing the post, the date/time, the platform interface, and the URL. Supplement with archived versions via the Wayback Machine or archive.today.

Authentication requirements for state courts:

Each target state has evidence rules governing authentication of electronic records and public documents. Generally: - Official government documents are self-authenticating under state evidence rules (typically the state analogue to FRE 902). - Social media posts and web content require a witness who can testify to the process of collection, or certification under the state's electronic records rules. - Video recordings require testimony about how they were obtained and that they have not been altered. - Recommendation: Designate a single custodian of records within the litigation team who will be responsible for authenticating all digital evidence. This person should maintain a detailed log of every item collected, including the date/time of collection, the source URL, the method of preservation, and a hash value (SHA-256) of the original file.

Category 2: The Minnesota Case Study — Real-World Evidence of Chilling Effects¶

Purpose: The January 2026 Minnesota experience is the single most powerful piece of evidence in the entire litigation — it provides concrete, real-world proof that armed federal presence near elections suppresses voter participation and disrupts democratic processes, even when agents do not actually appear at polling places.

What to collect:

A. Documented Impact on the January 27, 2026 Special Election (District 64A, St. Paul)

Campaign disruption testimony: Rep. Meg Luger-Nikolai's statements that her campaign had to stop door-knocking at single-family homes to avoid frightening residents during the ICE surge. The campaign shifted to apartment buildings only, coordinating with building managers — and even that dried up after the Renee Good shooting on January 7.
Direct quote from Luger-Nikolai: "After Renee Good was murdered and things started to escalate we started getting notes from caretakers that said, 'We will let you into the building, but I wouldn't recommend it.' They were hearing from residents that they were freaked out."
She described the resulting campaign as "suboptimal" and "a little bit reminiscent of 2020" during COVID lockdowns.
District 64A has a large immigrant population — over 60,000 immigrants lived in St. Paul as of 2019 census data.
Turnout data: Obtain official election results from the Minnesota Secretary of State for the January 27 special election. Compare turnout to baseline special election turnout in similar districts. While Luger-Nikolai won overwhelmingly (95.28%), analyze whether absolute turnout numbers were depressed relative to expectations, particularly in precincts with larger immigrant populations.
Precinct caucus data: The Minnesota DFL reported over 30,000 people turned out for February 3 precinct caucuses — described as "close to presidential year" levels. However, the party had to deploy 9,000 trained observers and have lawyers standing by for potential ICE interference. This operational cost is itself evidence of the chilling effect — that the mere threat of ICE required extraordinary defensive measures to maintain democratic participation.

B. Sworn Declarations from Campaign Workers and Voters

Collect sworn declarations (affidavits or declarations under penalty of perjury) from:

Campaign staff and volunteers who experienced the disruption firsthand — door-knockers who were told not to come, phone-bankers who spoke with frightened voters, field organizers who had to redesign voter contact strategies.
Building managers/caretakers who warned campaigns away from their buildings due to resident fear.
Individual voters in District 64A and surrounding areas who:
Considered not voting due to fear of ICE
Changed their voting behavior (e.g., drove rather than walked to polls, went at unusual times)
Experienced anxiety about leaving their homes during the ICE surge
Are naturalized citizens who feared being questioned despite legal status
Are members of mixed-status families who feared the entire family would be affected
Minnesota DFL Party officials — Richard Carlbom (DFL Chair) stated: "The way that ICE is acting here in the state, it's making people fearful of even leaving their house." Obtain a sworn declaration documenting the party's operational response, including the decision to train 9,000 observers and retain lawyers for caucuses.
Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon — his statements about the "ransom" demand and his refusal to hand over voter data. Simon also stated: "We're imagining ways in which the federal government might explicitly or implicitly interfere with the administration of elections, and we're planning out what our response would be."

C. Documentation of ICE Violence That Created the Climate of Fear

Renee Good shooting (January 7, 2026): 37-year-old mother of three, shot dead by an immigration agent in Minneapolis. This event caused the dramatic escalation of fear that directly impacted the special election campaign.
Alex Pretti shooting (January 24, 2026): 37-year-old ICU nurse, shot multiple times by federal agents while filming an immigration operation. ProPublica identified the CBP agents involved. Video of the shooting exists and has been widely circulated.
Tens of thousands of residents gathered to protest following the Pretti shooting.
These shootings are not directly about polling places, but they are essential evidence of the climate of fear that makes the threatened ICE deployment at polls so intimidating. They establish that this is not a theoretical or abstract fear — federal agents have killed two American citizens in the state, and the community is traumatized.

Collection protocol:

All voter and campaign worker declarations should be collected using a standardized form that includes the declarant's name, address (which can be filed under seal), voter registration status, relevant demographic information, and a detailed narrative of their experience. Declarations should be executed under penalty of perjury under the laws of the relevant state.
Turnout data should be obtained from the Minnesota Secretary of State's official election results database.
Media coverage of the ICE surge, shootings, and election disruption should be preserved as both screenshots and full article text. Key sources include HuffPost, The Hill, NPR, Democracy Docket, and local Minnesota media.
Video footage of protests, ICE operations, and the community response should be downloaded and preserved with metadata intact.

Category 3: Polling Data and Public Opinion Evidence¶

Purpose: Establishes the breadth and reality of the chilling effect across the electorate — not just in Minnesota but nationwide. Critical for showing that the threat of ICE deployment is already suppressing voter enthusiasm and creating widespread fear, satisfying the "reasonable person" standard under no-intent voter intimidation statutes.

What to collect:

A. Data for Progress Poll (January 30 – February 2, 2026)

This is the gold standard polling evidence. Key findings: - 64% of voters believe Trump will attempt to deploy immigration enforcement agents to prevent participation in the 2026 midterms (81% of Democrats, 66% of Independents, 45% of Republicans). - 56% of voters support blocking ICE enforcement actions at polling locations. - 59% disapprove of the Trump administration's proposed deal to decrease ICE presence in Minnesota in exchange for voter file data. - Methodology: 1,307 U.S. likely voters, web panel, weighted to be representative by age, gender, education, race, geography, and recalled presidential vote. Margin of error ±3 percentage points.

B. Brookings Institution Analysis (February 2026)

Only 55% of voters have confidence in ICE; only 8% of independents have "a great deal" of confidence.
ICE approval is a significant liability for Republicans in multiple competitive Senate races.
Presidential approval data shows declining support for Trump's handling of immigration since June 2025.

C. Additional polling to commission or identify:

State-specific polling in target states on fear of ICE at polls
Polling of naturalized citizens and members of mixed-status families
Polling of Latino, Asian-American, and African-American voters on the deterrent effect of armed federal agents at polling places
Historical polling from 2020 when Trump made similar (but less concrete) threats

D. Academic Research

Dr. David Niven (University of Cincinnati) study: Police presence at polling locations in Alabama was associated with a 32% reduction in African-American voter participation. This is the most directly relevant empirical finding for establishing disparate impact.
MIT Election Lab analysis on the role of law enforcement in elections.
Any studies on the deterrent effect of immigration enforcement on civic participation (not just voting but census participation, community engagement, etc.).

Collection protocol:

Obtain the complete Data for Progress survey methodology, topline results, and crosstabs. Contact Data for Progress directly to request the full dataset for potential expert witness use.
Commission state-specific polling through a reputable polling firm. The polls should be designed by a political scientist who can serve as an expert witness on methodology and findings.
Locate and download all relevant academic papers. Contact authors to arrange potential expert witness testimony.
Preserve all polling data with metadata showing collection dates, methodology, and sample characteristics.

Category 4: Expert Witness Declarations and Reports¶

Purpose: Provides the court with authoritative, specialized analysis that goes beyond lay testimony — connecting the factual evidence to the legal standards for injunctive relief, particularly on questions of chilling effects, disparate impact, and the functioning of election systems.

Experts to retain:

A. Political Scientist — Voter Behavior and Intimidation

Ideal candidate: Dr. David Niven (University of Cincinnati) or similar scholar with published research on the effects of law enforcement presence on voter turnout.

Their declaration should address: - The empirical evidence that armed law enforcement presence at polling places suppresses turnout, with a focus on the documented 32% reduction in African-American turnout in Alabama - The mechanism by which even the threat of armed presence (without actual deployment) creates a measurable chilling effect - The disproportionate impact on communities of color, immigrant communities, and mixed-status families - Why the harm from voter suppression is irreparable — votes not cast cannot be recovered - Analysis of the Data for Progress and other polling data showing the scope of the chilling effect

B. Election Administration Expert

Ideal candidate: A former state election director or current election administration scholar who can testify about: - The operational disruption that armed federal agents at polling places would cause to election administration - How state election codes and buffer zone laws are designed to create environments conducive to free voting - The specific procedures that would be disrupted by ICE presence (check-in processes, accessibility requirements, provisional ballot procedures) - The impossibility of remedying election-day disruptions after the fact - How the Minnesota special election experience illustrates these disruptions

C. Immigration and Community Impact Expert

Ideal candidate: An immigration scholar or community organizer who can testify about: - The pervasive fear in immigrant communities and mixed-status families during ICE enforcement operations - How this fear extends to naturalized citizens and even native-born citizens of color who fear being profiled - The specific communities in target states that would be most affected - How the Minnesota ICE surge created lasting fear that persists beyond the immediate enforcement period

D. Constitutional Law Expert

Ideal candidate: A law professor specializing in state constitutional law or election law who can testify about: - The historical purpose and scope of state "free elections" clauses - The independent force of state constitutional voting protections as compared to federal protections - The anti-commandeering doctrine and its application to state cooperation with federal immigration enforcement at polling places - The inapplicability of the Purcell principle to state courts

E. Statistical/Demographic Expert

To provide quantitative analysis of: - Demographic composition of polling precincts in target municipalities — identifying which precincts have the highest concentrations of Latino, immigrant, and mixed-status family voters - Projected turnout impact based on the Niven study and other empirical literature - Disparate impact analysis showing that ICE presence would disproportionately affect protected communities

Collection protocol:

Retain experts through formal engagement letters specifying the scope of their testimony, compensation, and timeline.
Expert reports should be prepared in accordance with each target state's expert disclosure requirements. Most states require disclosure of: the expert's qualifications, a statement of opinions, the basis for those opinions, the data relied upon, and compensation.
Expert declarations for preliminary injunction proceedings can be less formal than trial testimony but should still be thorough and well-supported.
Timeline: Expert engagement should begin immediately to allow sufficient time for report preparation before initial filings.

Category 5: Legislative and Regulatory Evidence¶

Purpose: Establishes the legal framework that defendants (state/local election officials) are obligated to enforce, and that ICE deployment would violate.

What to collect:

A. State Constitutional Provisions (primary source documents)

For each target state, obtain the official text of: - Free elections clauses (CO Art. II § 5; WA Art. I § 19; OR Art. II § 1; PA Art. I § 5) - Voting rights provisions (MN Art. I § 2; NV Art. 2 § 1A) - Equal protection clauses (all states) - Free speech/expression provisions (all states, with special attention to OR Art. I § 8)

B. State Voter Intimidation Statutes (annotated copies)

For each target state, obtain: - The statute text - Legislative history showing the statute's purpose - Any administrative guidance or attorney general opinions interpreting the statute - Case law construing the statute

Key statutes requiring full documentation: - Colorado HB25-1225 (Freedom from Intimidation in Elections Act) — full bill text, committee reports, floor debate transcripts, governor's signing statement - Minnesota § 211B.075 (MN VRA civil intimidation provision) - Pennsylvania 25 P.S. § 3047 (100-foot police exclusion zone) - Washington RCW 29A.84.510 (acts prohibited near voting centers)

C. State Voting Rights Acts

Full text and legislative history of: - Washington Voting Rights Act (2018) - Oregon Voting Rights Act (2019) - Minnesota Voting Rights Act (2024) - Colorado Voting Rights Act (2025)

D. Municipal Ordinances

Minneapolis separation ordinance (updated January 2026) — prohibits police from enforcing federal immigration laws
Madison, Wisconsin sanctuary-style policies
Any other municipal non-cooperation or election protection ordinances in target jurisdictions
Model ordinance text from the campaign's own ordinance project

E. Federal Statutes (as persuasive authority)

18 U.S.C. § 592 — full text and legislative history
18 U.S.C. § 594 (voter intimidation)
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act)
52 U.S.C. § 10307(b) (Voting Rights Act § 11(b))
Sen. Alex Padilla's proposed amendment to DHS funding bill explicitly banning federal law enforcement from patrolling polls

Collection protocol:

Official statute text should be obtained from state legislature websites or official code publications.
Legislative history should be requested from state legislative services offices. For recent legislation (CO HB25-1225, MN VRA), committee hearing recordings and written testimony may still be readily available.
Municipal ordinances should be obtained from city clerk's offices or municipal code databases.
All materials should be organized in a binder structure mirrored across all target states for easy cross-reference.

Category 6: Precedent Case Law and Legal Authority¶

Purpose: Provides the legal foundation for all claims and motions across all three phases.

What to collect:

A. State Constitutional Voting Rights Cases

League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 2018 Pa. LEXIS 771 (PA Supreme Court) — establishing independent enforceability of PA Art. I § 5
Carter v. Lehi City, 269 P.3d 141 (Utah 2012) — state constitutional voter standing
Any state court cases interpreting "free elections" clauses in CO, WA, OR, PA
State court cases establishing that state constitutional voting protections are broader than federal protections

B. Voter Intimidation Cases

DNC v. RNC consent decree (1982–2018) — the 36-year consent decree prohibiting RNC "ballot security" operations, including deployment of armed off-duty law enforcement at polling places in minority neighborhoods. While the decree expired in 2018, its factual findings about the intimidating effect of armed presence at polls remain relevant.
Pendleton v. State, 2006 Ohio case involving voter intimidation claims
Any state court cases interpreting state voter intimidation statutes
Cases establishing that voter intimidation constitutes per se irreparable harm

C. Anti-Commandeering and Sanctuary Policy Cases

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) — federal government cannot commandeer state officers
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) — extending anti-commandeering
City of Chicago v. Sessions and similar sanctuary city cases upholding non-cooperation policies
State court decisions upholding municipal sanctuary/separation ordinances

D. Standing and Class Certification Cases

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) — associational standing framework
State court decisions on voter standing in each target state
Class certification decisions in election-related cases in target states
FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024) — understanding the federal standing restrictions that make state court more attractive

E. Removal and Remand Cases

Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) — concurrent state court jurisdiction
State v. Meadows, 92 F.4^th 1324 (11^th Cir. 2024) — affirming remand where federal officer removal failed
28 U.S.C. § 1442 cases defining the scope of federal officer removal
CAFA removal and remand cases for class actions seeking injunctive relief

F. Purcell Principle Inapplicability

Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) — Kavanaugh concurrence confirming Purcell is limited to federal courts
Yablon & Clinger, "Purcell Principles for State Courts," Wisconsin Law Review (2024) — comprehensive analysis
State court decisions granting pre-election relief without applying Purcell

Collection protocol:

All cases should be obtained from Westlaw, LexisNexis, or Google Scholar and saved as PDFs.
For each case, prepare a brief summary (1-2 paragraphs) identifying the holding, the relevant facts, and how it supports the litigation strategy.
Organize cases by category and by target state.
Maintain a master case law table with columns for: citation, jurisdiction, date, key holding, applicable phase of litigation, and applicable legal theory.

Category 7: Real-Time Evidence Collection Infrastructure (Phase 3)¶

Purpose: Provides the organizational capacity to document and present evidence of actual ICE deployment or imminent deployment during the election period, supporting emergency TRO motions.

What to build:

A. Voter Incident Reporting System

Design and deploy (before the election period) a system for real-time reporting of federal law enforcement presence near polling places. This system should:

Allow voters, poll watchers, and election officials to report sightings of federal agents near polling locations via a mobile-friendly web form and a dedicated phone hotline.
Capture: date/time, polling location, description of agents (uniforms, vehicles, weapons, identification), number of agents, distance from polling place entrance, any interactions with voters or election officials, photos/video if available.
Automatically geolocate reports and map them against known polling locations.
Feed directly to the litigation team for immediate use in emergency TRO motions.
Be operational in all eleven target states.

B. Election Observer Network

Coordinate with existing election protection organizations to deploy trained legal observers at high-risk polling locations in target states. Observers should be trained to:

Identify ICE/CBP agents and vehicles (uniforms, markings, tactical gear)
Document agent presence using timestamped photos and video
Maintain observation logs with precise distances, times, and descriptions
Immediately report to the litigation team's central command
Serve as potential witnesses for emergency court filings

Priority deployment locations: polling places in neighborhoods with high concentrations of Latino/immigrant voters in target municipalities.

C. Pre-Drafted Emergency Motions

Prepare before the election period:

Template TRO motions for each target state, with blanks for specific facts about the deployment being challenged
Supporting memoranda of law (which can be substantially completed in advance)
Proposed orders for each state court
Declarations from organizational plaintiffs (which can be executed in advance with updates)
Expert declarations on chilling effects (updated versions of Phase ½ declarations)

These should be ready to file within hours of receiving confirmed reports of ICE deployment near polling places.

D. Media and Social Media Monitoring

Establish a monitoring operation to track:

All statements by administration officials about election-related deployments
Federal agency press releases regarding deployment plans
Right-wing media advocacy for ICE at polls
Social media posts by federal officials, ICE union representatives, and administration allies
Local media reports of federal agent sightings near election infrastructure

Use automated alerts (Google Alerts, social media monitoring tools) supplemented by human review.

III. CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS¶

Digital Evidence Chain of Custody¶

All digital evidence must maintain an unbroken chain of custody from collection to courtroom presentation. The following protocol applies to all categories:

1. Collection - Assign each evidence item a unique identifier (format: EVD-[CATEGORY]-[STATE]-[YYYY]-[SEQUENTIAL NUMBER]) - Record the collector's name, the date/time of collection, the source URL or location, and the method of collection - For web content: use both screenshots (full page with URL bar visible) and archived copies (Wayback Machine/archive.today submissions) - For video/audio: download original files; do not rely on streaming links that may become unavailable - For documents: obtain from official government sources where possible

2. Preservation - Calculate and record SHA-256 hash values for all digital files at the moment of collection - Store original files in read-only format; create working copies for analysis - Maintain three copies of all evidence: (a) primary secure cloud storage with version control; (b) local encrypted backup; © off-site physical backup - For particularly critical evidence (Bannon video, Leavitt briefing, Bondi letter), consider having a notary public witness the preservation process

3. Authentication for Court - Designate a single records custodian who can testify to the entire collection and preservation process - Prepare a custodian declaration template for each target state's evidentiary requirements - For web content, prepare declarations explaining how web archives work and why screenshots accurately reflect the content as it appeared on the specified date - For government documents, rely on self-authentication provisions in state evidence rules

4. Organization - Maintain a master evidence index spreadsheet with the following fields: - Evidence ID - Category (1-7) - Description - Source - Date of original creation/publication - Date collected - Collector name - File format - SHA-256 hash - Storage location(s) - Authentication status (self-authenticating / requires custodian testimony / requires expert testimony) - Applicable litigation phase(s) - Applicable legal theory(ies) - Applicable target state(s) - Notes

IV. EVIDENCE MAPPED TO LITIGATION PHASES¶

Phase 1: Declaratory Relief¶

Standard to satisfy: A substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant declaratory relief.

Core evidence package:

Evidence Item	Source	Purpose
Bannon "surround the polls" statement (Feb 3, 2026)	War Room podcast video + transcript	Establishes credible, specific threat
Trump "nationalize voting" statements (Feb 2-4, 2026)	Multiple press sources, WH transcript	Establishes administration intent
Leavitt refusal to rule out ICE at polls (Feb 6, 2026)	WH press briefing video + transcript	Demonstrates ongoing, unresolved threat
Bondi letter demanding voter rolls for ICE withdrawal (Jan 24, 2026)	Official letter + court filings	Links ICE operations to election interference
MN special election disruption evidence (Jan 2026)	Voter/campaign declarations, turnout data	Concrete proof of chilling effect already occurring
Data for Progress poll (Feb 2026)	Survey report + methodology	64% of voters expect ICE deployment
Lyons testimony acknowledging no reason for ICE at polls (Feb 12, 2026)	Senate hearing transcript/video	Confirms deployment would be pretextual
American Oversight FOIA filings (Oct 2025)	FOIA request documents	Evidence that deployment planning was investigated
Expert declaration on chilling effects	Political scientist	Connects evidence to legal standard
State constitutional provisions + voter intimidation statutes	Official code compilations	Establishes the legal rights being threatened

Ripeness argument: The combination of Bannon's explicit statement, Trump's "nationalize voting" demands, Leavitt's refusal to rule out deployment, and the administration's demonstrated willingness to use ICE as leverage against election officials (Bondi letter) establishes a controversy of "sufficient immediacy and reality" that it cannot be dismissed as merely speculative.

Phase 2: Preliminary Injunctions¶

Standard to satisfy: (1) Likelihood of success on the merits; (2) Irreparable harm; (3) Balance of equities; (4) Public interest.

Additional evidence beyond Phase 1 package:

Evidence Item	Source	Purpose
Phase 1 declaratory judgment	Court records	Res judicata on legal questions; strongly supports likelihood of success
Updated polling on voter fear	Polling firm	Demonstrates ongoing and potentially worsening chilling effect
State-specific voter declarations from target jurisdictions	Direct outreach to voters	Personalizes harm for each state court
Expert report with demographic/statistical analysis	Demographer/statistician	Establishes disparate impact on protected communities
Any new administration statements escalating threats	Ongoing monitoring	Updates the factual record
Municipal ordinance passage records	Municipal clerks	Shows layered legal architecture being violated
Election official declarations about operational disruption	State/county election officials	Establishes that injunction protects government interests
FOIA responses or records from American Oversight investigation	American Oversight	May reveal internal planning documents

Irreparable harm argument: Voter intimidation constitutes per se irreparable harm because the right to vote in a specific election cannot be remedied after the fact. The Minnesota evidence demonstrates that the harm is already occurring. Expert testimony connects the polling data to projected turnout suppression. The State has a paramount interest in protecting the integrity of its elections.

Phase 3: Emergency TROs¶

Standard to satisfy: Same as preliminary injunction, plus demonstration of imminent, immediate threat requiring relief before the opposing party can be heard (for ex parte TROs) or on an expedited basis.

Evidence unique to Phase 3:

Evidence Item	Source	Purpose
Real-time reports of ICE/CBP agents near polling places	Voter incident reporting system	Direct evidence of the violation occurring
Timestamped photos/video of agents near polls	Election observers	Visual documentation for the court
Observer declarations	Trained legal observers	Sworn testimony about what was witnessed
Updated voter declarations showing deterrent effect	Voters in affected areas	Shows harm is immediate and ongoing
Communication from election officials about disruption	Election administrators	Shows operational impact
Pre-existing court orders (Phase ½) being violated	Court records	Demonstrates urgency of enforcement

Key procedural note: Emergency TRO motions in many states can be heard ex parte (without notice to the opposing party) if the movant demonstrates that notice would result in the harm occurring before the court can act. Pre-draft these motions to be filed within hours of confirmed reports. Include provisions for temporary relief pending a full hearing.

V. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS¶

Protecting Declarant Identity¶

Many voter declarants, particularly those in immigrant communities and mixed-status families, will have legitimate fear of retaliation if their identities become public. Litigation strategy should include:

Motions to file declarations under seal or with redacted names in all target state courts
Use of "Doe" plaintiffs where state procedural rules allow
Declarations from organizational plaintiffs that aggregate individual experiences without identifying specific persons
Expert declarations that discuss community-wide effects without naming individuals

Spoliation Concerns¶

The Trump administration may attempt to delete or alter official statements and documents. Proactive steps:

Send litigation hold letters to relevant federal agencies (ICE, CBP, DHS, DOJ, White House) once declaratory judgment actions are filed, requesting preservation of all communications regarding polling place deployment plans
These letters may not be enforceable against the federal government, but they create a record of the request and may support adverse inference arguments if evidence is destroyed
Rely primarily on independent preservation (your own downloads, Wayback Machine archives, Congressional Record entries) rather than government compliance

Coordination Across Jurisdictions¶

Evidence collected in one state may be admissible and useful in proceedings in other states. Establish a shared evidence repository that litigation teams in all eleven target states can access. Key items like the Data for Progress poll, expert declarations, and government statements are universally applicable. State-specific evidence (voter declarations, turnout data) may also be relevant as persuasive evidence in other jurisdictions — Minnesota's experience is probative in Colorado, Pennsylvania, and every other target state.

Updating the Evidentiary Record¶

This is a living document. The evidentiary landscape will continue to evolve rapidly as the November 2026 election approaches. Assign a team member to update the evidence index weekly and to flag any new developments that require immediate preservation. Key events to watch for:

Any new statements by administration officials about ICE at polls
DHS funding bill negotiations (Padilla amendment)
Arizona HB 2026 (proposed legislation to deploy ICE to polling places) — if enacted, this becomes powerful evidence that the threat is not hypothetical
Results of American Oversight FOIA requests
DOJ voter roll litigation developments
Any federal agency deployment orders or planning documents that become public
State attorney general actions or statements regarding election protection
Congressional hearings on election interference